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Abstract: 
As important sources that shape institutional structures in an economy, professional and trade associations play 
significant roles in bringing and legitimating institutional changes. This paper examines the roles of 
professional and trade associations' impacts on institutions associated with a nascent and formative sector of a 
developing economy. In empirical terms, the paper offers an in-depth case study of India's National Association 
of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) on institutional changes related to the offshoring industry. 
The NASSCOM case shows that under appropriate conditions, professional and trade associations represent an 
alternative to the state in shaping the industry landscape. 
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Article: 
1. Introduction 
In a rich body of theory and empirical research, economics and management scholars have examined 
institutional pressures associated with professional and trade associations. In prior literature, researchers have 
noted that such associations constitute the ―most elaborate and intricate organizational arrangements‖ (Scott, 
1992, p. 253) and play a significant role in legitimating institutional changes (Greenwood et al, 2002). Notably 
lacking from this literature, however, is explicit attention to such associations' roles in nascent and formative 
sectors of a developing economy such as offshoring. 
 
In order to understand professional and trade associations' roles in shaping a nascent industry in a developing 
economy (e.g., offshoring), it is important to examine such associations in relation to other institutional 
elements — most notably, the state. Note that the state is arguably the most important institutional actor 
(Bresser and Millonig, 2003; Groenewegen and Van der Steen, 2007). With regard to the state's role in 
influencing industry behavior in emerging economies, however, it is important to note that the rule of law is 
―often weakly developed‖ or sometimes ―ignored with impunity‖ in such economies (Bratton, 2007). Second, in 
nascent and formative sectors such as offshoring, there is no developed network of regulatory agencies 
comparable to established industrial sectors (Powell, 1993). As a consequence, there is no stipulated template 
for organizing the corporate actors, and thus pressures for conformity are less pronounced (Greenwood and 
Hinings,1996). In such settings, professional and trade associations may emerge to play unique and important 
roles in shaping the industry. 
 
In this paper, we seek to identify clear contexts and attendant mechanisms associated with professional and 
trade associations' roles in shaping a nascent and formative sector of a developing economy. In specific terms, 
we examine such associations in the context of offshoring sectors in emerging economies. For empirical 
grounding of theoretical concepts, we provide a case study of India's National Association of Software and 
Services Companies (NASSCOM), that country's prominent and powerful software industry and professional 
association, in transforming India's offshoring sector. It is important to note that NASSCOM has been a 
cornerstone of the Indian offshoring industry. 
 
As much as it has been our goal to be clear about our purpose in writing this paper, it has also been important 
for us to be clear about what our purpose is not. In this paper, we focus on association-specific characteristics of 
a particular professional as well as the generic position of professional associations vis-à-vis regulative 
institutions in shaping a nascent and formative sector in a developing country. It is important to note that 
professional and trade associations influence industry behaviors directly as well as through indirect causal 
chains. First, these associations' norms, informal rules, and codes of behavior can create order, without the law's 
coercive power, by relying on a decentralized enforcement process where noncompliance is penalized with 
social and economic sanctions (North, 1990). Second, prior research also indicates that professional associations 
can work closely with state agencies to protect their self-regulating independence and autonomy (Greenwood 
and Hinings,1996). In some situations, the state will collaborate with such associations to rationalize an arena of 
activity (Scott, 1992, p. 211). Professional and trade associations thus play an important role in strengthening 
the regulative institutions by providing the state with their expertise in developing new regulatory framework 
and strengthening the enforcement mechanisms. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we first provide an overview of the methodology used. Then, we discuss 
institutional contexts in emerging economies and roles of professional and trade associations in a newly 
developed economic sector. Then, we provide case study of India's NASSCOM, followed by a section on 
discussion of the case. The final section provides conceptual discussion and implications. 
 
2. Methodology: case study 
In broad terms, this paper employs case study method to understand contexts and mechanisms associated with 
professional and trade associations' influence on organizational arrangements in an emergent, high-growth 
economic sector of a developing economy (Montealegre,1999; Orlikowski and Baroudi,1991; Yin, 1989,1994). 
More to the point, the approach of this paper is a hypothesis testing case study (Lee, 1989). Given the 
uniqueness of NASSCOM's roles in influencing behaviors of firms in India's software and service sectors and 
our idiographic assumption, we consider case methods as the most appropriate approach to study this 
phenomenon. 
 
Yin (1989) suggests that the epistemological efficacy of case studies is justifiable when the research question 
focuses on reasons behind observed phenomena, when behavioral events are not controlled, and when the 
emphasis is on unfolding contemporary events. Other researchers argue that case research methodology is 
―appropriate and essential where either theory does not yet exist or is unlikely to apply, ... where theory exists 
but the environmental context is different ... or where cause and effect are in doubt or involve time lags‖ (Stuart 
et al., 2002). 
 
A sampling approach that focuses on theoretically useful cases is needed in case-based research (Eisenhardt, 
1989,1991; Yin, 1984). In particular, best practices models are arguably good candidates for a case research 
methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989,1991; Yin, 1984). In this connection it is worth noting that NASSCOM 
provides a ‗best‘ practice model for professional and trade associations in emerging economies. Indeed, trade 
associations in the offshoring sector in other emerging economies are modeled after NASSCOM. Brazil's 
Associação Brasileira das Empresas de Software e Serviços para Exportação (BRASSCOM) is such an 
example. It is also worth noting that NASSCOM is described as ―one of the most powerful trade bodies in 
India‖ (Mukhi, 2001). Moreover, Dewang Mehta, who was NASSCOM head from 1991 to 2001, was known as 
―one of the best lobbyists‖ in India (Mukhi, 2001). 
 
We used multiple information sources. We collected and analyzed extensive secondary materials. It is important 
to note that there has been a good amount of media coverage on NASSCOM. In addition, both authors made 
field visits to India and interviewed companies involved in offshoring as well as policymakers. 
 
3. Institutional contexts in emerging economies and professional and trade associations' roles 
As noted above, the state is arguably the most important institutional actor and powerful driver of institutional 
isomorphism, since violations of laws and regulations can result in harsh sanctions (Bresser and Millonig, 2003; 
Groenewegen and Van der Steen, 2007). Against this line of argument, it could be claimed that national legal 
systems, especially in developing countries, are far from effective in directing organizations' conduct and 
behaviors. There are rampant instances of confusion or conflict in comprehending the meaning of the law. It is 
an accepted axiom that laws-on-the-books are ambiguous (Baer et al., 1988; Madry, 2005). Edelman and 
Suchman (1997) note: ―the legal rules ‗cause‘ the organizational practices (or vice versa) is, at best, a gross 
simplification‖. Given the fluid context of state-enacted legal frameworks, windows of opportunity are created 
for non-state actors to step in and provide order. 
 
Pressures from professional networks and industry associations are typically framed as normative in nature 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983,1991), entailing reliance on informal rules, codes, peer pressures and 
embarrassment of non-compliers (Ellickson, 1991; Greif, 1993; Hoffman, 1999; Lawrence et al., 2001; North, 
1990). A profession is self-regulated by a code of ethics (Claypool et al., 1990; Cohen and Pant,1991), which 
require members to maintain higher standards of conduct than required by law (Backoff and Martin, 1991). 
Prior literature has indicated that professional associations also influence organizational arrangements through 
regulative and cognitive mechanisms (Greenwood et al., 2002; Scott, 1992, p.139). In addition to professional 
associations' direct roles in influencing their members' behavior, they also play indirect roles such as 
strengthening regulative institutions. For instance, professional associations provide the state with their 
expertise in developing new regulatory framework and strengthen enforcement mechanisms. 
 
3.1. Professional and trade associations vs. the government in shaping a nascent and formative sector 
As noted above, compared to established industrial sectors, in nascent and formative sectors (e.g., offshoring), 
there is no developed network of regulatory agencies (Powell, 1993). As a consequence, there is no stipulated 
template for organizing, and thus pressures for conformity are less pronounced (Greenwood and Hinings,1996). 
 
Most obviously, developing templates and monitoring industry behavior are resource and expertise intensive in 
emerging economic sectors. Most developing country governments are, however, characterized by weak public 
administration, inadequate technical competence and political leadership in the implementation of economic 
and social policies (Pugh, 1999; Saez,1998). But there's another point that is perhaps even more important. The 
government's ―subject positions‖ doesn't allow it to spend state resources to support a newly developing sector 
at the cost of competing sectors (Hoffman, 1999; Maguire et al., 2004). To put things in context, it is argued 
that offshoring has deepened social divisions in emerging economies (Aspden, 2006). This is because, in 
developing economies, while the outsourcing sector has become a new low-wage First World economy 
(Thurow, 2004) — thanks to elite education and modern technology (Ali, 2006), the traditional sector is 
economically disadvantaged. In some developing countries, there have been controversies about the impact of 
offshoring-led economic development on the poor segment of the population (Frankel, 2006). 
 
In sum, while the government tends to lack resources, expertise and legitimacy required in developing new 
template and monitoring industry behavior, professional and trade associations' influences are likely to be more 
readily apparent. With well-focused priorities, professional and trade associations are likely to be better, more 
effective and more efficient institutions. In line with these arguments, the following proposition is presented: 
 
Proposition 1. In an emerging economy, a professional or a trade association representing a nascent and 
formative industry is likely to be in a better position than the government in bringing institutional changes in 
the industry. 
 
3.2. Association — government collaboration 
Different institutional sources differ in terms of the nature of legitimacy and power. For instance, Vinogradova 
(2006) argues that formal associations' legitimacy can be mapped with ―strategies of positive incentive‖. Such 
strategies entail ―threat of exclusion from future transactions‖. On the other hand, traditional entities such as 
courts, security firms, private arbitration, use of criminals and/or connections work by ―strategies of coercion‖, 
which are related to threat of physical and financial punishment. 
 
Professional entities can be more powerful if they can influence legislation and push for other state-sanctioned 
actions (Campbell, 2004, p.146; Dickson et al., 2004, p. 83; Rogers and Streeck,1994; Streeck,1991,1997). Note 
that governments can successfully employ coercive power in introducing innovations and reforms in the market 
(Jepperson and Meyer,1991). 
 
Prior research indicates that professional associations can work closely with state agencies to promulgate and 
protect the self-regulating independence and autonomy (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Professional and trade 
associations' participation in national policy making arena is critical for the success of the industries represented 
by such associations (Wood and Bloch, 1995). Collaboration with the government in enacting and enforcing 
laws may help the association reassure the public and clients that members are likely maintain high standards 
(Ward et al., 1993). In some situations, the nation state also finds it necessary to collaborate with professional 
associations in order to ―rationalize‖ an arena of activity (Scott, 1992, p. 211). It is therefore proposed: 
 
Proposition 2. To bring institutional changes, professional and trade associations in emerging economies 
collaborate with the government in strengthening the regulative institutions. 
 
3.3. The state's regulatory and participatory roles 
Sobel's (1999) conceptualization of ―regulatory‖ and ―participatory‖ state can be very helpful in understanding 
the dynamics associated with the roles of professional and trade associations in shaping industry behavior. 
These factors supplement economic determinants of the attractiveness of an economic sector of developing 
countries. It can thus be argued that participatory and regulatory states can reduce political risk and help attract 
jobs and investments in the offshoring sector. In this section we first develop a 2 × 2 typology concerning the 
states' regulatory and participatory roles from the standpoint of professional associations' influence on industry 
behavior (Table 1). 
 
3.3.1. Regulatory roles 
By regulatory state, Sobel (1999) means a set of factors that influence the enforcement of contracts, the rule of 
law, the risk of expropriation, corruption of government, and bureaucratic quality. According to the 
International Country Risk Guide, a state with a strong regulatory role has ―sound political institutions, a strong 
court system‖ and citizens that are ―willing to accept the established institutions and to make and implement 
laws and adjudicate disputes‖. Put differently, a strong rule of law is characterized by effective punishment of 
offenders (Oxley and Yeung, 2001). 
 
In particular, it is important to emphasize that if business partners are engaged in relationships that are not long 
and deep, the recognition of contract law helps produce trust by providing recourse in the event of failure to 
honor a contract and thus lowers the transaction costs (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998; Nichols, 1999; Reed, 
2001; Stiglitz and Squire, 1998). An increased involvement in international business activities is likely to lead 
to shift from property transactions based on relationships to those based on formal and legal contracts (Nichols, 
1999). Most obviously, the newness of the offshoring sector means that established and entrenched relationships 
are rare. 
In this regard, it is important to note that while policymakers of many developing nations reassure the 
international business community of the commitment to the rule of law (Reed, 2001), the overriding reality 
seems far from satisfactory. In a survey of 23 African countries, Sievers (2001) found that governmental and 
judicial institutions were ―lower than needed for sustained high growth‖. Factors such as corruption, the quality 
of the rule of law, and the effectiveness of the national legal system in enforcing contracts acted as barriers 
hindering the development (Sievers, 2001). This reality is fundamental to the painfully low rate of FDI inflow 
in these economies. 
 
It is also important to note that countries with weak rule of law lack standard identifiers like the U.S. Social 
security number making it difficult to check potential employees' backgrounds, which is critical for the success 
of the offshoring sector. In some countries, it costs up to $1000 per employee to check backgrounds thoroughly 
(Schwartz, 2005). 
 
Some researchers argue that professional associations represent an alternative to the coercive state 
(Vinogradova, 2006; Walzer, 1993). Note that one of the roles of professional associations is to monitor their 
members' compliance with normative and coercive expectations (Greenwood et al., 2002). Most obviously, 
when the state's regulatory roles are weak, trade and professional associations may fill the regulatory vacuum. 
To put things in context, for instance, developed world-based offshoring clients are more likely to rely on trade 
associations such as NASSCOM than on the weak, ineffective domestic state. 
 
3.3.2. Participatory roles 
The term ―participatory state‖ captures the extent to which policies and institutions represent the wishes of the 
members of society (Sobel, 1999). In a participatory state, professional and trade associations carry enormous 
power to ―bridge or link‖ their members' interests ―with the formal and coercive decision-making power of the 
central state‖ (Hunter, 1993:123–124). These associations do so through ―dialogue, litigation, and mimesis‖ 
(Edelman and Suchman,1997). 
 
Developing nations vary widely in terms of such participation. In Russia, for instance, business groups and 
professional associations can offer private arbitration services and may establish private arbitration courts (Greif 
and Kandel,1995; Vinogradova, 2006). This enforcement mechanism has become a legal alternative to state 
courts (Vinogradova, 2006). In China, on the other hand, professional and trade associations are sanctioned by 
the state and many have party or government officials in their leadership (Dickson, 2003). Such structures are 
arguably designed to maintain the party's strong grip on the population. The above leads to the following: 
 
Proposition 3a. The degree of collaboration between a professional or a trade association and the government 
is likely to be higher in a weak regulatory environment than in a strong regulatory environment. 
 
Proposition 3b. Institutional changes that can be directly attributed to a professional or a trade association in 
an emerging economy are higher in a weak regulatory environment than in a strong regulatory environment. 
 
Proposition 4. Professional and trade associations' efforts to bring institutional change are facilitated more by 
a government in a high participatory system than in one with a low participatory system. 
 
3.4. Association specific factors 
Professional and trade associations differ ―socially, organizationally, and institutionally‖ in terms of their 
capabilities to facilitate diffusion of new ideas and to create revolutionary changes (Campbell, 2004, p.178). 
The concept of institutional entrepreneurship provides a dynamic framework to understand mechanisms 
associated with professional and trade associations' roles as institutional change agents. Daokui Li et al. (2006, 
p.358) define institutional entrepreneurs as those ―who not only play the role of traditional entrepreneurs in the 
Schumpeterian sense, but also help establish market institutions in the process of their business activities‖. A 
growing number of studies have suggested that entrepreneurs can change particular models of social or 
economic orders and construct new organizational fields — to institutionalize a model (Bartley, 2007; Daokui et 
al., 2006; Svejenova et al., 2007). 
 
A natural question is how institutional entrepreneurs initiate change. A valuable lead into this question is 
provided by Svejenova et al. (2007), who suggested four mechanisms associated with institutional changes: 
―creativity that generates continuous flow of new ideas; theorization that takes stock of these ideas; reputation 
within and outside the field that endorses ideas as worthy of attention, and dissemination that brings ideas to the 
public domain‖. 
 
3.4.1. Degree of eliteness of key individuals in the association 
The concepts of political elite (Moore, 1979) or national elite (Higley and Burton, 1989) can be very helpful in 
understanding how business associations and professional entities can influence national policymaking. 
According to Moore (1979), the term political elite refers to ―persons who by virtue of their institutional 
positions have a high potential to influence national policy making‖ (p. 674). Higley and Burton (1989) define 
―national elites as persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and 
movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially‖ (p.18). Prior 
researchers have noted that corporate executives, labor unions and various interests groups can be parts of 
national/ political elites (Moore, 1979; Parry, 1969). 
 
A related point is that a national/ political elite's effectiveness as an institutional entrepreneur is related to the 
elite's reputation ―within and outside the field that endorses ideas as worthy of attention‖ (Svejenova et al., 
2007). That is, reputation is about recognition by multiple communities and audiences. In sum, it can be argued 
that if key individuals in an association have a high degree of eliteness, they can bring substantial institutional 
changes at the industry level. Based on the above discussion, the following proposition is presented: 
 
Proposition 5. A professional or a trade association's ability to bring institutional change is positively 
associated with the degree of eliteness of key individuals in the association. 
 
3.4.2. Importance of arguments and actions directed towards diverse stakeholders 
The success of an economic sector is a function of how multiple communities perceive this sector. In the case of 
offshoring, these communities include the public in the offshoring originating and destination economies, the 
government, law enforcement agencies, existing and potential employees, etc. 
 
Institutional entrepreneurs' ―subject positions‖ need to be dominant that can allow them to gain wide legitimacy, 
bridge diverse stakeholders and compel other actors to change practices (Hoffman, 1999; Maguire et al., 2004). 
It is important for them to mobilize external and internal constituents, have financial resources (DiMaggio, 
1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Holm,1995) and be able to communicate with other institutional actors in 
the system so that their initiatives are perceived favorably (Groenewegen and Van der Steen, 2007). Proactive 
programs involving outreach activities directed towards multiple communities are critical in the theorization 
process. Such activities can contribute to the objectification process or the development of a growing consensus 
of the value of a social structure and its increasing diffusion (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). Thus, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 6. A professional or a trade association in an emerging economy theorizes new practices through 
arguments and actions directed towards diverse stakeholders. 
 
3.4.3. High performing and exemplar organizations as members of an association 
If an association has high performing and exemplar organizations as its members, the association is more likely 
to possess capabilities to facilitate diffusion of new ideas and to create revolutionary changes. As noted above, 
creativity, which is related to the production of new ideas (Drazin et al., 1999), is critical for bringing 
institutional changes. It can be argued that a professional or a trade association's creativity is related positively 
to the existence of high performing and exemplar organizations. At this point, it must be emphasized that one 
aspect of offshoring sector in emerging economies that renders it interesting to us is the fact that the industry is 
rapidly evolving. While all professional associations define and redefine the domain of their professions — ―the 
portfolios of activities and services over which members claim jurisdictional exclusivity‖ (Greenwood et al., 
2002) — through a reiterative processes, such processes are of greatest relevance for rapidly evolving economic 
sectors such as offshoring. 
 
A related point is that theorization or ―the development and specification of abstract categories and the 
elaboration of chains of cause and effect‖ is an important process through which institutional entrepreneurs 
facilitate the diffusion of new ideas (Greenwood et al., 2002:60). Theorization provides rationales for the 
practices to be adopted and thus increases the likelihood of acceptance of the practice (Strang and Meyer, 
1993). Two key elements of theorization concern framing and justifying. Framing focuses on the need for 
change and justification is value of the proposed changes for concerned actors (Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Maguire et al., 2004). Individuals in high performing and exemplar organizations are more likely to be capable 
of framing a need for a change and justifying it. 
 
Of equal importance in the discussion of professional and trade associations' role that follows below are indirect 
effects related to externalities that arise via what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) refer to as mimetic isomorphism 
(Table 2). Mimetic pressure entails mimicking behaviors of other actors that are perceived to be exemplar and 
have a higher degree of effectiveness (Dickson et al., 2004, p. 83; Lawrence et al., 2001). For example, 
Haveman (1993) found that savings and loan organizations followed diversification strategies that resembled 
those of successful firms within the industry. Burns and Wholey (1993) found that the adoption of matrix  
management by high-prestige hospitals influenced lower-prestige hospitals in their network to do the same. 
 
 
 
It is reasonable to expect that professional and trade associations facilitate and accelerate mimetic isomorphism. 
For instance, several prominent theories argue that norm-like features such as those associated with professional 
associations are effective if behaviors are observable (Bendor and Swistak, 2001; Ostrom, 2000; Weiss, 2000; 
Terlaak, 2007). A related point is that learning from the experiences of others is a sensible and optimal strategy 
when means-end relations are not well understood (Strang and Meyer, 1993). Most obviously exemplar firms 
serve as models for smaller firms to imitate. In such a case, knowledge flow takes place by externalities 
(Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Feldman, 1999; Niosi and Banik, 2005). It is important to emphasize that while 
mimetic isomorphism may take place in the absence of an association, the association is likely to accelerate the 
process by stimulating interaction among member companies. Beyond all that, the existence of exemplar firms 
also facilitates population-level learning. Miner and Haunschild (1995) define population level learning as 
"systemic change in the nature and mix of organizational action routines in a population of organizations, 
arising from experience" (p.118). It is thus proposed that: 
 
Proposition 7. The existence of high performing and exemplar organizations in a professional or a trade 
association is positively related to institutional changes in the industry. 
 
4. A case study: the NASSCOM effect on the Indian offshoring industry 
NASSCOM is a nonprofit organization established in 1988 to facilitate software and services business and to 
encourage R&D. Table 3 provides a timeline with important events, milestones, shocks and rebounds in 
NASSCOM's nearly two-decade long history at the time of this writing. It is probably the most fully developed 
example of an association found in the offshoring sector of developing economies. 
 
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to note that a number of indicators such as those related to export 
performance and security and privacy in Indian IT industry point to the fact that India has made a significant 
progress on the offshoring front. Indian IT industry's revenue grew from $4.8 billion in fiscal year 1997–98 to 
$47.8 billion in 2006–07 (Indo-Asian News Service, 2007). Likewise, this industry was estimated to employ 1.6 
million people in the early 2007 compared to 1.28 million in the early 2006 (Ribeiro, 2007). One would not 
typically expect developing country-based firms to have better security practices than those in the developed 
world. In light of the stereotypically different expectations that surround privacy and security in developing 
countries, it is important to note that security practices in India matched or exceeded those at most U.S. call 
centers (Engardio et al., 2004). Studies conducted by Forrester Research and by the U.K.'s Banking Code 
Standards Board indicated that standards in Indian call centers are among the best in the world and there were 
more security breaches in the U.S. in 2005 than in India (Precision Marketing, 2006). 
 
Much of the credit of the remarkable progress in Indian offshoring firms' success goes to NASSCOM, which 
has played a phenomenal role in monitoring the industry behavior and bringing significant institutional changes. 
Leahy (2004) notes that ―... in contrast to China's success in manufacturing, India's success in services has come 
in spite of the government rather than because of it‖. In the vacuum of weak state-crafted frameworks, non-state 
actors such as NASSCOM have found openings. NASSCOM has helped establish responsible industry 
behaviors and its role in representing Indian software companies has been ―exemplary‖ both abroad and at 
home (Express Computer, 2003). 
 
Initially, 38 members started NASSCOM, which accounted for 65% of the revenue of the software industry at 
that time (NASSCOM, 2008). Professional and trade associations' importance increases as a large number of 
businesses become aware of their existence, and the benefits offered by their membership (Vinogradova, 2006). 
NASSCOM's success in guiding the industry and monitoring its members' behaviors has created a virtuous 
circle. As of 2007, NASSCOM's membership grew to 1100, which accounted for over 95% of the revenues of 
the Indian software industry (NASSCOM, 2008). NASSCOM's members also include over 200 global 
companies from the U.S. Europe, Japan, China and other countries. Members' annual fees are based on their IT 
software and services revenue, and these fees ranged from $700 to $18,000 in 2004 (Ticoll, 2004). 
 
NASSCOM has established international affiliates in a number of countries including Australia and the U.K. 
(Ticoll, 2004). NASSCOM also has full time personnel in the Indian Embassy in Washington, DC to lobby for 
the association (Rana, 2004). 
 
NASSCOM monitors member companies to ensure they adhere to the standards. For instance, NASSCOM 
requires its members to self-police and provide additional layers of security. Non-compliant companies would 
lose memberships (Trombly, 2006). NASSCOM also coordinates and collaborates with other entities for its 
monitoring efforts. For instance, in the early 1990s, NASSCOM teamed up with the Manufacturers Association 
for Information Technology to launch the Indian Federation Against Software Theft (InFAST) to fight software 
piracy (Sharma, 1994). Similarly, NASSCOM announced its plan to have security practices of its members 
audited by international accounting firms (Engardio et al., 2004). Industry leaders also advocated the adoption 
of certification under the information security management systems (ISMS) of the British Standards Institution. 
The certification covers issues such as network security, data sanctity and terms of data utilization (Ravindran, 
2004). 
 
NASSCOM Foundation, the Corporate Social Responsibility division of NASSCOM, collaborated with 
TechSoup, a San Francisco-based nonprofit organization, to launch a technology assistance program for India's 
nonprofit and non-governmental organizations (Business Line, 2007). NASSCOM has also developed 
partnership with the government, companies, social organizations, policymakers and other stakeholders to 
develop public–private participation (Myiris.com, 2006). 
 
Most obviously, the software and services businesses of Indian firms depend on heavy investment in sales, 
marketing and branding (The Economist, 2003). As is the case of most developing country-based firms 
(Choi,1992; Lall, 1991), branding has been one of the major weaknesses facing NASSCOM members. 
Strengthening the brand associated with software and services offered by Indian firms has been of paramount 
importance to NASSCOM. To enhance the brand equity for Indian software and service industry, NASSCOM 
lobbied the Indian government (Rediff.com, 2001). These efforts have paid off brilliantly. India has succeeded 
in branding itself as the world's leading destination for not only relatively low end business process outsourcing 
(BPO) but also for high-end offshoring operations. For instance, multinationals such as GE medical labs and 
Hewlett–Packard research facilities are outsourcing high-end operations to India (Khanna and Mohan, 2006). 
 
4.1. NASSCOM vs. government agencies in India in shaping the offshoring sector (P1) 
As noted above, NASSCOM has played an important role in shaping the Indian offshoring sector. With regard 
to the state's role, it is worth noting an overriding reality in most developing countries — even if policymakers 
are interested in developing a modern economic sector (e.g., offshoring), the backwardness of competing 
economic sectors doesn't allow them to have a focused priority. In India, there have been controversies with 
regard to the impact of India's recent economic reforms, particularly the effect on the poor (Frankel, 2006). 
 
As it happened in the Andhra Pradesh (AP) state of India in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, if policymakers 
allocate disproportionately more resources to develop the offshoring sector, they face stiff opposition from the 
mass of population that depends on the traditional economy. Political opponents attacked the then Andhra 
Pradesh Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu's decision to raise rice and electricity prices by cutting subsidies as 
―anti-people‖, and branded as elitist his promotion of offshoring related sectors and foreign capital (Chanda, 
2000). Indian journalist Lionel Messias points out: ―Government officials do not hesitate to point out that with 
IT gaining precedence over all other sectors in [AP Chief Minister Chandrababu] Naidu's scheme of things, 
little attention is being paid to agriculture, the main and proven base of [Andhra Pradesh's] economy‖ (cf. 
Malhotra, 2001). Naidu, the so-described ―laptop‖ Chief Minister who played a pivotal role in the development 
of the state's IT industry including the offshoring sector, was voted out of the office in the May 2004 election. 
In such situations, professional and trade associations — working away from political limelight — are in a 
better position to bring about institutional changes. 
 
4.2. NASSCOM's collaboration with government agencies (P2) 
NASSCOM has collaborated with government agencies at various levels. Both the NASSCOM and the 
government have benefited from such collaborations. Ex-NASSCOM head, Dewang Mehta helped 19 state 
Governments in India to draft their IT policies (Voicendata, 2006). NASSCOM partnered with the Ministry of 
Information Technology to draft data protection and data privacy laws to respond to privacy concerns of 
offshore clients (Hazelwood et al., 2005; Engardio et al., 2004). The goal is to bring Indian data protection laws 
to the same level as European and U.S. standards (India Abroad, 2004). NASSCOM is working with the Indian 
government and organizations in terms of crafting and enforcing laws to tackle computer-related crimes (IT 
Week, 2006). In 2006, NASSCOM drafted plans for new legal measures to safeguard intellectual property and 
prevent data theft (IT Week, 2006). 
 
NASSCOM works with police officers, lawyers and industry bodies to ensure enforcement. NASSCOM meets 
with bar councils in different cities to educate legal communities, and holds meetings with police officers to 
educate them about cyber security and how to recognize and prosecute cybercrimes (Ticoll, 2004). NASSCOM 
started working with Mumbai police from 2003 (Saravade and Nandkumar, 2007). NASSCOM helped police 
departments of Mumbai and Thane in establishing a cybercrime unit and in training officers to investigate data 
theft (Indo-Asian News Service, 2006). Similar units were planned for other cities (Engardio et al., 2004). In 
2005, NASSCOM announced a training initiative for Pune's cybercrime unit, which caught data crime 
perpetrators from MphasiS, a major ICT company (Cone, 2005). NASSCOM also offered to work with 
authorities in the U.K. and India to investigate cases involving identity theft (Tribuneindia.com, 2005). The 
Data Security Council of India (DSCI), a self-regulatory member organization set up by NASSCOM, has the 
ability to expel non-compliant members or call in police — another example of the association's growing 
regulative role (McCue, 2007). 
 
NASSCOM asked the Indian government to create a special court to try people accused of cybercrimes and 
other violations of the country's Information Technology Act. The Indian government is considering 
NASSCOM's request in establishing such courts (Ribeiro, 2006). 
 
4.3. Government's regulatory roles and NASSCOM (P3) 
India arguably has a stronger rule of law compared to China (Varshney, 2007). Yet, having said this, it is also 
apparent that — like most developing countries — in terms of implementation the legal systems in India are 
highly underdeveloped (Engardio et al., 2004). Most of the Indian economy is ―backward looking, corrupted 
and poverty stricken‖ (MacDonald, 2006). Indian law on computer crime, for instance is ―fuzzy‖, and privacy 
enforcement is weak. As of 2006, no one charged for data fraud in India was convicted (Ribeiro, 2006). 
 
Some of NASSCOM's roles are thus associated with India's weak regulatory environment. India has no law 
requiring the protections of personal data. For instance, while India's Information Technology Act of 2000 has 
set up criminal penalties for certain violations of confidentiality and privacy, these privacy standards do not 
apply to businesses or commercial enterprises (GAO, 2006). The act also does not include provisions for 
general data protection. 
 
In an attempt to fill the regulatory vacuum, NASSCOM has introduced ―assessment and certification‖ programs 
for would-be employees, which are expected to discourage illegal and unethical behaviors (The Economist, 
2006). The National Skill Registry launched by NASSCOM in January 2006 is a voluntary registry for call 
center employees, which allows employers to perform background checks on existing or prospective employees 
(Trombly, 2006; Trombly and Yu, 2006). Creation of criminal and public records databases has been a part of 
the program (Fest, 2005). Potential employees can register their details in the database (Sawas, 2005). 
 
NASSCOM worked for over a year and invested $300,000 to launch an independent self-regulatory agency to 
improve privacy and data protection standards for the country's offshore IT services and BPO clients (Precision 
Marketing, 2006). The Data Security Council of India (DSCI), a self-regulatory member organization set up by 
NASSCOM, can expel non-compliant members or call police (McCue, 2007). The agency is funded by 
membership fees (Information ManagementJournal, 2006). In addition to speeding up the process of 
background checks, the new system — administered by an impartial third party — makes background checks 
easier to accomplish, less expensive, and more accurate (Schwartz, 2005). 
 
A key point related to a weak rule of law is that institutional entrepreneurs can take initiatives to break some 
rules. For instance, in 1986 when Texas Instruments (TI) proposed to establish a 100% export-oriented, foreign 
owned and operated subsidiary (its first outside the U.S.), India's Department of Electronics (DOE) and the 
government quickly processed the license, laws that prohibited such licensing notwithstanding. Evans quotes a 
DOE official: ―We broke 26 separate rules to accommodate TI's Bangalore subsidiary and are willing to break 
more‖ (1992, p. 7). In this way, even before the 1991 liberalization, businesses in India had formed an 
intriguing partnership with key decision makers in the government. 
 
4.4. Government's participatory roles and NASSCOM (P4) 
As to the participative role, it is important to note that the economic liberalization undertaken since 1991 has 
been a major driving force behind the growth and increased importance of trade and professional associations. 
Since the 1990s, there has been a shift from a state-dominated economic policy framework towards a 
decentralized one. Religious, social, economic and political associations have offered a viable set of examples 
encouraging the development of many new trade and professional associations (Frankel, 2006). A strong mutual 
interdependence between the state and the private economic actors, particularly organized business groups, has 
developed very quickly. The liberalization thus resulted in the shift of trade and professional associations' 
institutional location from Cell III to IV in Table 1. 
 
There has been an increase in leadership support for NASSCOM. This has changed NASSCOM's pattern of 
interaction with the government and member companies, thereby enhancing its institutional centrality 
(Campbell, 2004; Scott et al., 2000). The economy is less centralized with more room for associations to 
flourish and to have a strong voice (Frankel, 2006). 
 
A comparison of NASSCOM and China Software Industry Association (CSIA) is helpful in understanding how 
professional and trade associations differ in terms of ―social, organizational, and institutional locations‖ 
(Campbell, 2004, p.187) and hence the degree of eliteness. In China, special interest groups and non-
government entities are organized loosely (Li et al., 2004) and there is little room for these groups to influence 
national policymaking (Su and Yang, 2000). Chinese government's control arguably is a major obstacle to the 
autonomy and growth of associations in the country (Dickson, 2003; Frankel, 2006). Compared to NASSCOM, 
CSIA has thus played a relatively minor role in transforming structure and practices of Chinese companies 
(Shen, 2005). 
 
The Indian government has fulfilled many wishes of NASSCOM members. For instance, the government 
responded favorably to NASSCOM's lobbying efforts against income tax on profits (Table 3). Links between 
industry and government have helped ensure new policy proposals that are ‗enterprise-friendly‘ (Tessler et al., 
2003). NASSCOM has been active in providing inputs to the government, seeking improvements in 
infrastructure for producing software, and promoting exports (Nidumolu and Goodman, 1996). There has also 
been political support for collective infrastructure needs (Pingle, 1999). In the late 1990s, NASSCOM's 
lobbying efforts with the government led to the announcement of guidelines for call centers to operate in the 
country. Nonetheless, the initial guidelines were not comprehensive and did not address all the relevant issues. 
NASSCOM continued its lobbying efforts for more comprehensive guidelines (Preethi,1999). 
 
4.5. Degree of eliteness of key individuals in NASSCOM (P5) 
Officials from NASSCOM member companies are among the most influential members of the Indian political 
elite. For instance, NASSCOM has representatives in various committees in the Central Government of India 
including the Ministry of Information Technology, Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, Department 
of Telecommunication, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of 
External Affairs. NASSCOM also acts as a consulting body for various State Governments. Former NASSCOM 
head Dewang Mehta was a member of the National Task Force on IT and Software Development and also a 
member of various bodies including IT ministry's advisory group, state planning boards, and Indian Institute of 
Information Technology in Bangalore and Hyderabad (Rediff.com, 2001). NASSCOM's voice is thus heard 
clearly and loudly in the government (Ticoll, 2004). 
 
Key individuals in NASSCOM have been recognized by multiple communities and audiences. NASSCOM 
members and its management teams have had some distinctive advantages leading to the associations' 
reputation. For instance, Dewang Mehta, who was the head of NASSCOM from 1991 to 2001, was named by 
Computerworld Magazine as ―Software Evangelist of the Year‖ for three years in a row and ―IT Man of the 
Year‖ in 2000. In 2000, he was also named by the World Economic Forum as one of the ―100 Global Leaders 
of Tomorrow‖ (Parasher and Chatterjee, 2001). 
 
4.6. NASSCOM's arguments and actions directed towards diverse stakeholders (P6) 
NASSCOM engages in theorization and dissemination activities directed toward multiple communities and 
audiences. Speaking of lobbying efforts with the government to enhance India's IPR regime, Dewang Mehta 
noted: 
 
We lobbied with the government for changes in the Copyright Law. Although, the government at that 
stage, wanted to understand as to why we wanted these changes — as they thought it would benefit only 
the overseas companies. We said, maybe initially it would, but in the long run it would encourage 
Indians to create their own IPR. The government saw our point and in 1994, the copyright act was 
amended. On 10 May 1995 it was enforced (Preethi,1999). 
 
It is important to note that offshoring has raised the public's ire in the originating economies such as the U.S. In 
an attempt to alleviate the public's opposition to offshoring, NASSCOM has taken several measures. In 2003, 
NASSCOM widely publicized its study which indicated that IT outsourcing to India had improved U.S. 
employment figures (Communications of the ACM, 2003). To help counter the negative image of outsourcing, 
NASSCOM also hired the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton and worked with the latter to educate 
lawmakers about the negative implications of such measures and emphasized potential burden to U.S. taxpayers 
(Express Computer, 2003). NASSCOM also hired a former senior White House adviser, a former U.S. 
ambassador to India, as its chief Washington lobbyist (Giridharadas, 2007). In 2007, NASSCOM drew the 
attention of U.S. lawmakers to an Immigration Bill prohibiting companies with over 50 people from hiring H-
1B employees if they have more than 50% employees with H-1B visas (Hindustan Times, 2007). A letter stated: 
―NASSCOM and the Indian IT industry clearly see this as a protectionist measure that will affect Indian 
ITcompanies, reduce the number of H1-B holders going to the US and reduce the competitiveness of the IT 
industry in the US‖ (Hindustan Times, 2007). 
 
NASSCOM-BSA alliance works with software resellers to educate end-customers and companies about the 
negative effects of piracy (Sify.com, 2005). Likewise, NASSCOM launched CyberSafety Week, an awareness 
campaign, which aimed to educate computer users about cybercrimes (Saravade and Nandkumar, 2007). 
NASSCOM also holds regular ―club‖ meetings in major cities. Dewang Mehta, ex-head of NASSCOM noted: 
 
..[W]e invite the member companies, government officials, the press, leading IT users, politicians, 
bureaucrats, diplomats. It is a meeting ground where a lot of information is exchanged, people are able 
to talk frankly [over cocktails]. It creates a good understanding between people across segments, not 
only among members. We hold meetings very often, about six club meetings per year per city
1
. 
 
Next, consider NASSCOM's arguments directed towards offshoring related companies, encouraging them to 
join the association. Speaking of importance of the membership in the new body, the Data Security Council of 
India (DSCI), a self-regulatory member organization set up by the association, NASSCOM President, Kiran 
Karnik put the issue this way: ―While it would be voluntary for the members to be part of the body, it would 
ensure at the same time that market forces make it mandatory for companies to register themselves‖ (Business 
Line, 2007). Note too that a professional association's enforcement strategy becomes efficient and powerful if a 
large number of firms in the industry join the association (Vinogradova, 2006). NASSCOM members supported 
the new body enthusiastically. As of 2006, over 1000 companies accounting for 98% of the Indian IT industry 
agreed to take DSCI membership (MarketWatch: Global Round-up, 2006). 
 
4.7. The existence of high performing and exemplar organizations (P7) 
Most of NASSCOM's success can be attributed to its effective management team. NASSCOM has been led by 
representatives from India's high performing organizations. In this regard, it is important to note that the China–
India difference in the offshoring sector is powerfully illustrated in industry structures. For instance, average 
size of software firms in terms of the number of employees is 25 in China compared to 174 in India (Kshetri, 
2005). Likewise, most companies in the Chinese offshoring sector have fewer than 1000 employees compared 
to 292,000 combined headcount at India's top-5 firms — with the top firm TCS employing 83,500 people 
representing 60 nationalities (Press Trust of India, 2007). As noted above, the existence of high performing and 
exemplar organizations has helped transform the behaviors of firms in the Indian offshoring sector. In fact, 
NASSCOM's role in India goes much beyond the domain of software and services. For instance, NASSCOM 
officials have provided powerful lobbying for the Indian venture capital industry (Uttam, 2005). 
 
5. Discussion 
Before proceeding, it is important to note one thing: NASSCOM is not a typical industry association. Although 
there are many developing world based industry associations established to bring institutional changes, few 
have done their jobs more skillfully than by NASSCOM. The association unfailingly showed its capability to 
monitor the members' behaviors. 
 
Prior researchers have noted that associations have to depend on the state to achieve some of their goals 
(Walzer,1993). The NASSCOM case shows that due to the relatively weak coercive power of industry 
associations, such associations may turn to stronger regulative institutions such as the court systems and police 
to enforce the substance of legal claims. 
 
Lawrence et al. (2002) argue that generation of proto-institutions —―new practices, rules, and technologies that 
transcend a particular collaborative relationship and may become new institutions‖ — is important to bring 
institutional changes. The research literature provides abundant evidence that an institutional change measure is 
more likely to be successful if attention is paid as to how the measure is embedded in the ―wider institutional 
field‖ (Lawrence et al., 2002). In this regard, it is important to note that NASSCOM's institutional change 
measures are viewed as a part of larger and more complex policymaking arenas that transcend the offshoring 
sector. NASSCOM has emphasized the importance of the Indian ICT industry's economic contribution. 
NASSCOM has framed offshoring as an avenue of job creation for a seemingly bottomless source of the Indian 
labor force. In a study, NASSCOM estimated that call center and back office operations would create one 
million jobs by 2008 (Ghosh, 2001). The NASSCOM Foundation's measures and its partnership with the 
government, companies, social organizations, policymakers and other stakeholders to develop public–private 
participation as noted above illustrate the generation of proto-institutions. Prior researchers have also noted that 
―dissemination that brings ideas to the public domain‖ is critical to bring institutional changes (Svejenova et al., 
2007). In this regard, dissemination measures such as CyberSafety Week (Saravade and Saravade, 2007) and 
those related to counter the negative image of outsourcing in origination countries (Express Computer, 2003) 
have strengthened proto-institutions. NASSCOM ex-head, Dewang Mehta put the issue this way: 
 
..[I]n 1991, when I used to say, we are a lobby group, people used to take offence. How can you call an 
association a lobby group? But we were honest. We were not lobbying for something that was a vested 
interest. We were lobbying for something that was good for the entire industry, good for the country as 
well as good for the people of the country. That is the philosophy at Nasscom. We do not lobby for 
something that is only good for the industry, but is not good enough for the country or the people of our 
country (Preethi, 1999). 
 
One of the most straightforward explanations for NASSCOM's success in promoting and reinforcing desired 
industry behavior is its employment of diverse strategies. In addition to its role in developing and enforcing 
industry codes and standards, NASSCOM has successfully collaborated with the government and law 
enforcement strategies. In this way, ―strategies of positive incentive‖ are combined with ―strategies of coercion‖ 
(Vinogradova, 2006). 
 
As noted above, starting the early 1990s, NASSCOM took a wide variety of measures intended to strengthen 
the country's intellectual property rights (IPR) regime. These measures have paid off brilliantly. Strong 
copyright laws have facilitated firm-level innovations in the country (Varshney, 2007). It is important to note 
that foreign MNCs are more confident to outsource activities involving IPR and sensitive business information 
to India than to China (The Economist, 2006). A similar point can be made about the development of capital 
market (Varshney, 2007). In China, local politicians hinder mergers and consolidation, especially the ones 
involving firms outside their regions, while NASSCOM encourages such activities in India (The Economist, 
2006). 
 
It is also worth noting that from the perspective of the development of modern economic sectors (e.g., 
offshoring industry) in a developing economy — sectors that resemble the First World-type economy (Thurow, 
2004) — a participatory state can cut both ways. In India's case, federal and state governments have fulfilled 
many wishes of NASSCOM members (e.g., favorable response to NASSCOM's lobbying efforts against income 
tax on profits, support for collective infrastructure needs and development of guidelines for call centers). The 
Andhra Pradesh state example noted above, on the other hand, indicates that the mass of population depending 
on the traditional economy may vigorously oppose the elite, modern sector if disproportionately more state 
resources are allocated to develop the offshoring sector. 
 
Special creative ideas from NASSCOM include deployment of full time personnel in the Indian Embassy in 
Washington, DC, to lobby for the association (Rana, 2004) and inviting different stakeholder groups over 
cocktails to exchange information and ideas (Parthasarathy, 2004). Other highly creative ideas are demonstrated 
in dissemination measures such as CyberSafety Week (Saravade and Nandkumar, 2007) and those taken to 
counter the negative image of outsourcing in origination countries (Express Computer, 2003). In 2003, 
NASSCOM also identified six untapped areas in offshoring (Siliconindia, 2003). 
 
Several limitations of this research and boundary conditions must be recognized in a balanced discussion of its 
findings. Before proceeding further, it will be useful to distinguish between statistical generalization in survey 
research and analytical generalization in case studies (Harrison and Freeman, 1999; Yin, 1994). In analytical 
generalization, the investigator attempts to ―generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory‖ 
(Yin,1994, p. 36). The reliance on a single case limits the analytical generalizations that can be drawn from the 
findings discussed above. Analytical generalizations about professional and trade associations' roles in bringing 
institutional changes in other emerging economies thus must be made with caution. This is because our 
investigation builds on a study of specific factors associated with NASSCOM and the Indian economic and 
political systems. 
 
First, proposition 1 stated that a professional or a trade association is likely to be in a better position than the 
government in bringing institutional changes. The relative importance of state in bringing institutional changes 
may increase with the state's level of involvement in the economy. The reason why CSIA has played less 
important role than NASSCOM in shaping the Chinese IT industry is perhaps because of the state's deeper 
entrenchment in the Chinese economy. For instance, according to UBS, the state accounts for at least 70% of 
the Chinese economy compared to less than 7% in India (Pei, 2006). As of 2001, in 70% of large- and medium-
sized ―corporatized‖ enterprises, the communist party members were in the board of directors (Pei, 2006). 
 
Second, the extent to which a developing world-based government places emphasis on and derives its 
legitimacy from economic growth affects professional and trade associations' ability to influence legislation and 
push for other state-sanctioned actions. Note that the government has to deal with the demands of competing 
institutional actors. Some nascent and formative sectors such as offshoring are associated with economic 
growth. If a government considers distributive justice (e.g., focus on the poor, a higher level of attention to 
traditional sector such as agriculture) more important than economic growth, it is less likely to be influenced by 
professional and trade associations in the formative sectors such as offshoring. 
 
Third, developing economies differ in terms of the type of legal and political systems and the society's 
propensity to change. As Table 4 indicates, offshoring destinations differ widely in terms of the rule of law 
indicators, which ―measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable 
rules form the basis for economic and social interactions‖ (Kaufmann et al., 2003). Professional and trade 
associations' role in bringing institutional changes may vary across economies with different levels of the rule 
of law indicators and different types of legal systems. To illustrate this, we now call attention to situations in 
developing economies with legal systems influenced by Islamic law such as Pakistan and Oman. Consider 
Oman, where CBay Systems, the world's third largest medical transcription service provider has invested, in a 
BPO venture (Company News Feed, 2007). Oman is considered to be a holistic society (Kshetri and Ajami, 
2008). Note that a holistic society is often characterized by an ideology (e.g., Islam) that ―claims validity for all 
spheres of action and thought‖ and an action's legitimacy is evaluated on the basis of a ―general binding moral 
prescripts imposed by a superior authority‖ rather than by economic, political or juridical logics (Zweynert and 
Goldschmidt, 2006). Compared to an ―extended‖ society, institutional change measures are likely to face more 
resistance in a holistic society (Kshetri and Ajami, 2008). Note that in Oman and many Arab economies, on 
most political issues, the monarchs are arguably ―more liberal than the societies over which they reign‖ 
(Zakaria, 2004, p.1). Deliberations in the parliaments of these countries tend to focus more on social than 
economic and political issues (Kéchichian, 2004). Professional and trade associations' participation in national 
policy making arena is thus likely to be limited in a holistic society. Likewise, in a holistic society, institutional 
entrepreneurs tend to possess limited capability to bring institutional changes. 
 
Three further observations are worth making regarding the Indian legal system from the standpoint of 
offshoring. The first observation is that as is the case of the U.S., the Indian legal system is based on English 
common law (Table 4). The compatibility of legal systems is thus likely to facilitate the inflow of outsourcing 
jobs from major outsourcing origin economies with similar legal system such as the U.S. and the U.K. (Gray, 
2007). Second, India's rule of law index is much higher than its major competitors such as the Philippines, 
China and Pakistan. Emerging economies with stronger rule of law than India (e.g., Barbados, Hungary and 
Oman), on the other hand, may have a lower level of factor endowments needed for the growth of offshoring 
sector. Third, as to the fairness and predictability of the judicial process and enforcement mechanisms, there are 
reasons to believe that India's position vis-à-vis other emerging economies is better in the offshoring sector than 
in other economic sectors. New regulative measures (e.g., the government's consideration to create a special 
cybercrime courts and the DSCI's involvement in enforcement mechanism) illustrate the strengthening 
regulative institutions in the offshoring sector. 
 
Finally, there is the issue of fairness. The strength of rule of law is a function of how citizens perceive the 
fairness of the legal system and how willing they are in obeying the laws (The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 
1997). This insight can be extended to institutions associated with professional and trade associations. 
Members' perceptions of an association's fairness in enforcing informal rules and codes influence their 
willingness to obey them. Put differently, if member companies perceive that the association has acted unfairly 
in devising and enforcing codes, the association's ability to bring institutional changes will be limited. 
 
6. Conclusion and implications 
This paper provided novel and unique insights related to professional and trade associations' roles in a rapidly 
emerging economic sector of a developing economy. The overarching message conveyed by our theory is that 
in a rapidly developing economic sector of emerging economies, under certain conditions, professional and 
trade associations are likely to be relatively more effective than the government in developing templates and 
have powerful impact on members' behaviors. For instance, NASSCOM has conceived what type of industry 
behavior is acceptable to clients based in the developed world. In addition to direct influences, professional 
associations influence industry behaviors through longer causal chains and externality mechanisms. For 
instance, India's offshoring sector has some successful firms. Externalities unique to the offshoring industry 
have helped improve industry behavior. 
 
It is an accepted axiom that an industry's success is a function of its ability to realign with and adapt to the 
changes in major shifts in technology, market and other external factors (Kumaresan and Miyazaki, 2001). As 
noted above, due to the inadequate technical competence (Pugh, 1999) and a lack of funds and resources (Saez, 
1998), developing country governments are ill prepared to help industries realign with and adapt to the changes 
in the environment. 
 
Institutional changes discussed above have different degrees of substantiveness. For instance, as noted above, 
the Indian government is considering NASSCOM's request to create a special court to try people accused of 
cybercrimes and other violations of the country's Information Technology Act (Ribeiro, 2006). Likewise, 
NASSCOM has gained political support for collective infrastructure needs (Pingle,1999). This means that the 
government has taken at least symbolic actions. Theorists argue that a symbolic change may lead to more 
substantive changes subsequently (Campbell, 2004, p. 43; Edelman, 1990,1436–37; Forbes and Jermier, 2001, 
208; Guthrie,1999, xii; Oakes et al., 1998). 
 
Future research on this topic should help us better understand the phenomenon of professional and trade 
associations that are becoming pervasive in the rapidly growing global offshoring industry, and perhaps to find 
better ways of managing it. Future research based on the present framework can be extended to other emerging 
economies and/or economic sectors. Other national settings might differ from the offshoring sector examined in 
this paper in terms of factors such as the degree of newness, development of regulatory frameworks, and 
pressure for customer-centric behaviors. 
 
Different theoretical contributions and various empirical studies have led to the accepted view that the 
government's supportive role through such mechanisms as new laws, investment incentives, foreign technology 
transfer, and other supply–push and demand–pull forces (King et al., 1994; Kraemer et al., 1992; 
Montealegre,1999) play an important role in the development of an ICT industry. In this initial model, we did 
not extensively pursue this line of reasoning for the sake of simplicity. It may, however, be an area to examine 
in the future when constructing more complete and complex model of professional and trade associations' 
influence in industry behaviors. 
 
Research conducted across various settings (e.g., American brewery population (Baron, 1962) and the 
Argentine newspaper population (Carroll, 1987:135)) indicate that organizations established in an adverse 
environment are able to experience collective learning and possess capacity to survive after the ―adolescence‖ 
stage (Swaminathan, 1996). It is important to note that many NASSCOM members also dealt with adverse 
conditions. For instance, visa regulations against Indian software professionals, particularly in the U.S. in the 
early 1990s, forced Indian companies to opt out of the ―body-shopping practice‖ and to do works in India 
(Behari,1994). This helped enhance their IT skills thereby bringing competitiveness in its IT exports. These 
external factors' influence on NASSCOM members' performance might also be worthwhile target of study. 
 
One issue that was raised in this article but not fully developed was about effects on the industry behavior via 
mimetic isomorphism. One avenue for future research thus would be to examine the difference in the nature of 
mimetic isomorphism in companies that are members in professional and trade associations (e.g., NASSCOM) 
and those that are not members. 
 
The NASSCOM case shows that the association helped the government develop new regulatory frameworks 
and enforce laws while performing some of the regulative roles. In this regard, our work also opens new areas 
of research related to a typology in terms of the regulative roles that are enforced by the government versus 
those that are enforced by the professional and trade associations. 
 
Finally, one of the important goals of NASSCOM was to enhance the brand equity related to the Indian 
offshoring sector. In this regard, researchers could also look at NASSCOM's activities from a collective 
industry and national level brand building perspective. 
 
Notes: 
1 Parthasarathy's (2004) interview with late Dewang Mehta, former Secretary, NASSCOM. 
 
References 
Ali, M.M., 2006. India's booming economy poses challenges as well as opportunities. Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs 25 (6), 36–37. Aspden, R., 2006. The Bangalore effect. New Statesman 19 (896), 26–27. 
Audretsch, D., Stephan, P.,1996. Company scientist locational links: the case of biotechnology. American 
Economic Review 30, 641–652. 
Backoff, J.F., Martin, C.L., 1991. Historical perspectives: development of the codes of ethics in the legal, 
medical and accounting professions. Journal of Business Ethics 10, 99–110. 
Baer, X., March, J.G., Saetren, X., 1988. In: March, J. (Ed.), Implementation and Ambiguity, in Decisions and 
Organizations. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 150–164. Baron, S.,1962. Brewed in America. Little Brown, Boston, 
MA. 
Bartley, T., 2007. How foundations shape social movements: the construction of an organizational field and the 
rise of forest certification. Social Problems 54 (3), 229–255. 
Behari, M.,1994. Where to invest in a country of extremes. Asiamoney 41 (April). 
Bendor, J., Swistak, P., 2001. The evolution of norms. American Journal of Sociology 106,1493–1549. 
Benson, M., Simpson, G.R., 2001. Privacy measure for U.S. is backed by trade group. Wall Street Journal 6 
(January 18, Section B). 
Bratton, M., 2007. Formal versus Informal Institutions in Africa. Journal of Democracy 18, 96–110. 
Bresser, R.K.F., Millonig, K., 2003. Institutional capital: competitive advantage in light of the new 
institutionalism in organization theory. Schmalenbach Business Review 55 (3), 220–241. 
Burns, L.R., Wholey, D.R.,1993. The diffusion of matrix management: contagion effects, structural effects, and 
institutional effects on innovation adoption. Academy of Management Journal 36,106–138. 
Business Line, 2007. Info-Tech Nasscom Body Launches Online Donor Scheme. 
Campbell, J.L., 2004. Institutional Change and Globalization. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Carroll, G.R.,1987. Publish and Perish: The Organizational Ecology of Newspaper Industries. JAI Press, 
Greenwich, CT. 
Chanda, N., 2000. Limits of vision. Far Eastern Economic Review 20 (Feb 24). 
Choi, C.J., 1992. Marketing barriers facing developing country manufactured exporters: a comment. Journal of 
Development Studies 29 (1),166–171. 
Claypool, G.A., Fetyko, D.F., Pearson, M.A., 1990. Reactions to ethical dilemmas: a study pertaining to 
certified public accountants. Journal of Business Ethics 9, 699–706. 
Cohen, J.R., Pant, L.W.,1991. Beyond bean counting: establishing high ethical standards in the accounting 
profession. Journal of Business Ethics 10, 45–46. Communications of the ACM, 2003. Juggling Outsourcing 
Stats. 46 (9), 11. 
Company News Feed Formerly Regulatory News Service, 2007. CBaySystems Holdings — First Day of 
Dealing. June 18. 
Cone, E., 2005. Is offshore BPO running aground? CIO Insight 53, 22. 
Daokui, L.D., Feng, J., Jiang, H., 2006. Institutional entrepreneurs. American Economic Review 96 (2), 358–
362 (May). 
Dickson, B.J., 2003. Whom does the party represent? From ―three revolutionary classes‖ to ―three represents‖. 
American Asian Review 21 (1), 1. 
Dickson, M., BeShers, R., Gupta, V., 2004. The impact of societal culture and industry on organizational 
culture: theoretical explanations. In: House, R.J., Hanges, P.J., 
Javidan, M., Dorfman, P.W., Gupta, V. (Eds.), Culture, leadership, and organizations: the GLOBE study of 62 
societies. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. DiMaggio, P., 1988. Interest and agency in institutional 
theory. In: Zucker, L. (Ed.), Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and environment. Ballinger, 
Cambridge, MA, pp. 3–21. 
DiMaggio, P.J., Powell, W.W., 1983. The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review 48,147–160. 
DiMaggio, P.J., Powell, W.W., 1991. In: Powell, W.W., DiMaggio, P.J. (Eds.), Introduction, in the new 
institutionalism in organizational analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 1–38. 
Drazin, R., Glynn, M.A., Kazanjian, R.K.,1999. multilevel theorizing about creativity in organizations: a 
sensemaking perspective. Academy of Management Review 24 (2), 286–307. 
Edelman, L.B.,1990. Legal environments and organizational governance: the expansion of due process in the 
American workplace. American Journal of Sociology 95,1401–1440. 
Edelman, L.B., Suchman, M.C.,1997. The legal environments of organizations. Annual Review of Sociology 
23, 479–515. 
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management Review 14, 532–
550. 
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1991. Better Stories and better constructs: the case for rigor and comparative logic. Academy 
of Management Review 16, 620–627. Ellickson, R., 1991. Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Engardio, P., Puliyenthuruthel, J., Kripalani, M., 2004. Fortress India? Business Week 3896, 42–43 (August 
16). 
Express Computer, 2003. Nasscom Upholds the Industry's Interest, Once Again. 7 April 2003 
http://www.expresscomputeronline.com/20030407/newsan1.shtml. Feldman, M., 1999. The new economics of 
innovation, spillovers and agglomeration: a review of empirical studies. Economics of Innovation and New 
Technology 8, 5–25. Fest, G., 2005.Offshoring: Feds take fresh look at India BPOs; major theft has raised more 
than a few eyebrows. Bank Technology News 18 (9) (Sep 1). 
Forbes, L.C., Jermier, J.M., 2001. The institutionalization of voluntary organizational greening and the ideals of 
environmentalism: lessons about official culture from 
symbolic organization theory. In: Hoffman, A.J., Ventresca, M.J. (Eds.), Organizations, Policy, and the Natural 
Environment: Institutional and Strategic 
Perspectives. Stanford University Press, pp. 194–213. 
Frankel, R., 2006. Associations in China and India: An Overview, European Society Of Association Executives. 
(http://www.esae.org/articles/2006_07_004.pdf). 
GAO, 2006. Domestic and Offshore Outsourcing of Personal Information in Medicare, Medicaid, and 
TRICARE, United States Government Accountability Office (September). 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06676.pdf. 
Ghosh, D., 2001. Nasscom to frame standards for call centers. India Abroad XXXI (33), 34 (May 18). 
Giridharadas, A., 2007. Lobbying in U.S., Indian firms present an American Face. New York Times 1 
(September 4). 
Gray, S., 2007. Turning the tide. Lawyer 21 (4), 37 (January 29). 
Greenwood, R., Hinings, C.R.,1996. Understanding radical organizational change: bringing together the old and 
the new institutionalism. Academy of Management Review 21 (4),1022–1054. 
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R., Hinings, C.R., 2002. Theorizing change: the role of professional associations in 
the transformation of institutionalized fields. Academy of Management Journal 45 (1), 58–80. 
Greif, A.,1993. Contract enforceability and the economic institutions in early trade: the Maghribi traders‘ 
coalition. American Economic Review 83, 525–548. Greif, A., Kandel, E.,1995. Contract enforcement 
institutions: historical perspective and current status in Russia. In: Lazear, E. (Ed.), Economic Transition in 
Eastern Europe and Russia. Hoover Institutions Press, Stanford University. 
Groenewegen, J., Van Der Steen, M., 2007. The evolutionary policy maker. Journal of Economic Issues 41 (2), 
351–358. 
Guthrie, D.,1999. Dragon in a Three-Piece Suit: The Emergence of Capitalism in China. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Harrison, J.S., Freeman, R.E.,1999. Stakeholders, social responsibility, and performance: empirical evidence 
and theoretical perspectives. Academy of Management Journal 42 (5), 479–485. 
Haveman, H.A., 1993. Follow the leader: mimetic isomorphism and entry into new markets. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 38, 593–627. Hazelwood, S.E., Hazelwood, A.C., Cook, E.D., 2005. Possibilities and pitfalls 
of outsourcing. Healthcare Financial Management 59 (10), 44–48. Higley, J., Burton, M.G., 1989. The elite 
variable in democratic transitions and breakdown. American Sociological Review 54 (1), 17. 
Hindustan Times, 2007. NASSCOM Challenges US Senators On Visa Bill. May 30. 
Hoffman, A.J., 1999. Institutional evolution and change: environmentalism and the U.S. chemical industry. 
Academy of Management Journal 42 (4), 351–371. Holm, P.,1995. The dynamics of institutionalization: 
transformation processes in Norwegian fisheries. Administrative Science Quarterly 40, 398–420. Humphrey, J., 
Schmitz, H.,1998. Trust and inter-firm relations in developing and transition economies. The Journal of 
Development Studies 34 (4), S32–S61. Hunter, A., 1993. National federations: the role of voluntary 
organizations in linking macro and micro orders in civil society. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 22,121–136. 
India Abroad, 2004. High Labor Attrition Biggest Threat To BPO Sector. XXXIV(38), A32, (June 18). 
Indo-Asian News Service, 2006. Nasscom To Set Up Self-Regulatory Organization. September 26. 
Indo-Asian News Service, 2007. Indian IT revenue grows 10-fold in decade. NASSCOM, January 23. 
Information Management Journal, 2006. Indian Agency to Enforce Outsourced Data Security. 40(4), 9. 
IT Week, 2006. Indian fraud hits HSBC. 6, July 3. 
Jepperson, R.L., Meyer, J.W.,1991. The public order and construction of formal organizations. In: Powell, 
W.W., DiMaggio, P.J. (Eds.), the New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, pp. 204–231. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2003. Governance matters III: governance indicators for 1996–2002. 
World Bank, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3106 
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters2001.htm). 
Kéchichian, J.A., 2004. Democratization in gulf monarchies: a new challenge to the GCC. Middle East Policy 
11 (4), 37–57. 
Khanna, P., Mohan, C.R., 2006. Getting india right. Policy Review 135,43–61. 
King, J.L., Gurbaxani, V., Kraemer, K.L., McFarlan, F.W., Raman, K.S., Yap, C.S.,1994. Institutional factors in 
information technology innovation. Information Systems Research 5 (2),139–169. 
Kraemer, K.L., Gurbaxani, V., King, J.L., 1992. Economic development, government policy, and the diffusion 
of computing in Asia-Pacific countries. Public Administration Review 52 (2),146–156. 
Kshetri, N., 2005. Structural shifts in the Chinese software industry. IEEE Software 22 (4), 86–93. 
Kshetri, N., Ajami, R., 2008. Institutional reforms in the gulf cooperation council economies: a conceptual 
framework. Journal of International Management 14 (3), 300–318. 
Kumaresan, N., Miyazaki, K., 2001. Management and policy concerns over shifts in innovation trajectories: the 
case of the Japanese robotics industry. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 13 (3), 433. 
Lall, S.,1991. Marketing barriers facing developing country manufactured exporters: a conceptual note. Journal 
of Development Studies 27 (4),137–150. Lawrence, T.B., Winn, M.I., Jennings, P.D., 2001. The temporal 
dynamics of institutionalization. Academy of Management Review 26 (4), 624–644. 
Lawrence, T.B., Hardy, C., Phillips, N., 2002. Institutional effects of interorganizational collaboration: the 
emergence of proto-institutions. Academy of Management 
Journal 45 (1), 281. 
Leahy, C., 2004. China and India: Foes or Friends? Euromoney. September 1. 
Lee, A.S.,1989. A scientific methodology for MIS case studies. MIS Quarterly 13 (1), 33–49. 
Li, M., Lin, Z., Xia, M., 2004. Leveraging the open source software movement for development of China‘s 
software industry. Information Technologies and International Development 2 (2), 45–63. 
MacDonald, S.B., 2006. A tale of two Indias (economic development). Society 72 (6), 43–48. 
Madry, Alan R., 2005. Global concepts, local rules, practices of adjudication and Ronald Dworkin's law as 
integrity. Law and Philosophy 24 (3), 211–238. Maguire, S., Hardy, C., Lawrence, T.B., 2004. Institutional 
entrepreneurship in emerging fields: Hiv/Aids treatment advocacy in Canada. Academy of Management Journal 
47 (5), 657–679. 
Malhotra, P., 2001. Bytes, bombs, and bombshells. Harvard International Review 23 (3), 32–35. 
MarketWatch: Global Round-up, 2006. Nasscom Cutting Down on Offshoring Worries? 5(7),197–198. 
McCue, A., 2007. India gets offshore cyber crime watchdog, silicon.com (7 June). 
http://services.silicon.com/bpo/0,3800004865,39167417,00.htm. 
Miner, A.S., Haunschild, P.R.,1995. Population level learning. In: Cummings, L.L., Staw, B.M. (Eds.), 
Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 17. JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, pp. 115–166. 
Montealegre, R., 1999. A temporal model of institutional intervention for information technology adoption in 
less-developed countries. Journal of Management Information Systems 16 (1), 207–232. 
Moore, S.,1979. The structure of a national elite network. American Sociological Review 44, 673–691. 
Mukhi, V., 2001. Remembering Dewang. Siliconindia 5 (5), 84 (May). 
Myiris.com, 2006. NASSCOM Catalysing Change in Villages. (April 6 http://www.myiris.com). 
NASSCOM, 2006. Anti-Piracy Hotline. http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=6253. 
NASSCOM, 2008. About NASSCOM. http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=5365. 
Nichols, P.M., 1999. A legal theory of emerging economies. Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 229, 233–
234. 
Nidumolu, S.R., Goodman, S.E.,1996. Computing in India: an Asian elephant learning to dance. 
Communications of the ACM 36 (3),15–19. 
Niosi, J., Banic, M., 2005. The evolution and performance of biotechnology regional systems of innovation. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 29, 343–357. North, D.C.,1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Oakes, L.S., Townley, B., Cooper, D.J., 1998. Business planning as pedagogy: language and control in a 
changing institutional field. Administrative Science Quarterly 43 (2), 267–302. 
Orlikowski, W.J., Baroudi, J.J., 1991.Studying information technology in organizations: research approaches 
and assumptions. Information Systems Research 2 (2),1–28. Ostrom, E., 2000. Collective action and the 
evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14,137–159. 
Oxley, J.E., Yeung, B., 2001. E-commerce readiness: institutional environment and international 
competitiveness. Journal of International Business Studies 32 (4), 705–723. Parasher, P., Chatterjee, S., 2001. 
Dewang Mehta: 1962–2001; IT‗Evangelist‘ Mehta found dead in Sydney Hotel. India Abroad XXXI (29), 32 
(April 20). 
Parry, G.,1969. Political Elites. Praeger Publishers, Inc, New York. 
Parthasarathy, B., 2004. Globalizing information technology: the domestic policy context for India's software 
production and exports. Iterations: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Software History 1–38 (May 3 
http://www.cbi.umn.edu/iterations/parthasarathy.html#63f). 
Pei, M., 2006. The dark side of China's rise. Foreign Policy 153, 32–40. 
Pingle, V.,1999. Rethinking the Development State: India's Industry in Comparative Perspective. St. Martin's 
Press, New York. 
Powell, W.W., 1993. The social construction of an organizational field: the case of biotechnology. Paper 
presented at the Warwick–Venice Workshop on perspectives on strategic change, University of Warwick. 
Precision Marketing, 2006. India Call Centres Set to Triple US Bank Work. 18(42), 9, (October 6). 
Preethi, K., 1999. Interview - Dewang Mehta. (September 18 
http://www.ciol.com/content/news/interviews/199091801.asp). 
Press Trust of India, 2007. IT majors speed up hiring, headcount nearly 3 Lakh. The Indian Express Online 
Edition (21 November 2007 http://www.indianexpress. com/story/21423.html). 
Pugh, C.,1999. Getting good government: capacity building in the public sectors of developing countries. Urban 
Studies 36 (2), 400–402. Rediff.com, 2001. Nasscom Chief Dewang Mehta Found Dead In Sydney. (April 12 
http://www.rediff.com/money/2001/apr/12dewang.htm). Rana, K.S., 2004. Economic diplomacy in India: a 
practitioner perspective. International Studies Perspectives 5 (1), 66–70. 
Ravindran, P., 2004. Factors that are worrisome for BPO sector. BusinessLine 1 (April 3). 
Reed, O., 2001. Law, the rule of law, and property: a foundation for the private market and business study. 
American Business Law Journal 38 (3), 441–473. Ribeiro, J., 2006. India's Nasscom calls for special 
cybercrimes court. Network World (September 7, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2006/090706-indias-
nasscom-calls-for-special.html ). 
Ribeiro, J., 2007. 33% growth projected for Indian outsourcers. Computerworld 41 (5), 20 (January 29). 
Rogers, J., Streeck, W.,1994. In: Freeman, R.B. (Ed.), Workplace Representation Overseas: The Works Council 
Story, Working Under Different Rules. Sage, Russell, New York, pp. 97–156. 
Saez, L., 1998. The multiverse of democracy/decentralised governance in Asian countries. Journal of 
Contemporary Asia 28 (2), 284–288. Saravade, P., Nandkumar, S., 2007. A public–private partnership in India: 
broken windows in cyberspace. Police Chief 74 (3),16. 
Sawas, A., 2005. Indian suppliers plan staff screening service. Computer Weekly 8 (April 19). 
Schwartz, K.D., 2005. The background-check challenge. InformationWeek 59–61 (July 18). 
Scott, W.R., 1992. Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems. Prentice Hall. 
Scott, W.R., Ruef, M., Mendel, P.J., Caronna, C.A., 2000. Institutional Change And Healthcare Organizations: 
From Professional Dominance To Managed Care. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. 
Sharma, R.,1994. New Copyright Laws to Boost Software Firms. News India Times 24 (23), 36 (June 10). 
Shen, X., 2005. Dilemma for developing countries in intellectual property strategy? Lessons from a case study 
of software piracy and Microsoft in China. Science & Public Policy 32 (3),187–198. 
Sievers, S.E., 2001. Competitiveness and foreign direct investment in Africa. In: Nsouli, S.M. (Ed.), Policies to 
Promote Competitiveness in Manufacturing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Paris. 
Sify.com, 2005. BSA, Nasscom to Curb Anti-Piracy. (26 April 
http://sify.com/finance/fullstory.php?id=13727665). 
Siliconindia, 2003. NASSCOM Picks ―Hot' Fields For Indian IT Cos.7(5),14. 
Sobel, A.C.,1999. State Institutions, Private Incentives, Global Capital. University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor. 
Stiglitz, J., Squire, L., 1998. International development: is it possible? Foreign Policy 110,138–151. 
Strang, D., Meyer, J.W.,1993. Institutional conditions for diffusion. Theory and Society 22 (4), 487–511. 
Streeck, W., 1991. On the institutional conditions of diversified quality production. In: Matzner, E., Streeck, W. 
(Eds.), Beyond Keynesianism, pp. 21–61. 
Streeck, W., 1997. Beneficial constraints: on the economic limits of rational voluntarism. In: Hollingsworth, 
J.R., Boyer, R. (Eds.), Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Stuart, I., McCutcheon, D., Handfield, R., McLachlin, R., Samson, D., 2002. Effective case research in 
operations management: a process perspective. Journal of Operations Management 20 (5), 419–433. 
Su, F., Yang, D.L., 2000. Political institutions, provincial interests, and resource allocation in reformist China. 
Journal of Contemporary China 9 (24), 215–230. Svejenova, S., Mazza, C., Planellas, M., 2007. Cooking up 
change in haute cuisine: Ferran Adrià as an institutional entrepreneur. Journal ofOrganizational Behavior 28 (5), 
539. Swaminathan, A.,1996. Environmental conditions at founding and organizational mortality: a trial-by-fire 
model. Academy of Management Journal 39 (5),1350–1377. Terlaak, A., 2007. Order without law? The role of 
certified management standards in shaping socially desired firm behaviors. Academy of Management Review 
32 
(3), 968–985. 
Tessler, S., Barr, A., Hanna, N., 2003. National software industry development: considerations for government 
planners. ElectronicJournal of Information Systems in Developing Countries 13 (10),1–17. 
The Economist, 2003. Business: techno-coolies no more. Indian Software 367 (8323), 65 (May 10). 
The Economist, 2006. Special report: watch out, India — outsourcing to China. Outsourcing to China 379 
(8476), 80 (May 6). 
The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 1997. Legitimizing criminal justice policies and practices. Speech of Mark 
H. Moore as part of the Perspectives on Crime and Justice Series of the National Institute of Justice — 
Transcript (October). 
Thurow, L.C., 2004. Do only economic illiterates argue that trade can destroy jobs and lower America's national 
income? Social Research 71 (2), 265–278. Ticoll, D., 2004. IT IndustryTrade Associations and the 
Globalization of Knowledge Work, Review of NASSCOM and The Irish Software Association. October, http:// 
www.itac.ca/Archive/PolicyandAdvocacy/Outsourcing/04OctITIndustryTrade-AReviewofNASSCOM.pdf. 
Tolbert, P.S., Zucker, L.G., 1996. Institutionalization of institutional theory. In: Clegg, S., Hardy, C., Nord, W. 
(Eds.), The Handbook Of Organization Studies. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 175–190. 
Tribuneindia.com, 2005. Outsourcing Crime Call Centre Expose Can Wreak Havoc. June 25, 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050625/edit.htm. Trombly, M., 2006. India tightens security. Insurance 
Networking & Data Management 10 (1), 9. 
Trombly, M., Yu, W., 2006. Outsourcing resilient in India. Securities Industry News 18 (26),1–21 (July 10). 
Uttam, J., 2005. Convergence of finance, technology and entrepreneurship: the role of liberal financial system 
in the making of India's New Economic Growth Regime (NEGR). Journal of International and Area Studies 12 
(1),111–138. 
Varshney, A., 2007. India's democratic challenge. Foreign Affairs 86 (2), 93. 
Vinogradova, E., 2006. Working around the state: contract enforcement in the Russian context. Socio-Economic 
Review 4 (3), 447. 
Voicendata, 2006. Late Dewang Mehta: Dreamt of Making India an IT Superpower, December 7, 2006,150th 
issue. http://voicendata.ciol.com/content/150issue/ 106120726.asp. 
Walzer, M.,1993. Between nation and world: welcome to some new ideologies. Economist 328 (7828), SS49–
52 (September 11). 
Ward, S.P., Ward, R., Deck, D.R., Alan, B.,1993. Certified public accountants: ethical perceptions, skills and 
attitudes on ethics education. Journal of Business Ethics 12, 601–610. Weiss, E.B., 2000. Conclusions: 
understanding compliance with soft law. In: Shelton, D. (Ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-
Binding Norms in the International Legal System. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 535–553. 
Wood, J.R., Bloch, J.P.,1995. The Role of church assemblies in building a civil society: the case of the united 
Methodist general conference's debate on homosexuality. Sociology of Religion 56 (2),121. 
Yin, R.,1984. Case study research: Design and methods (1st ed.). Sage Publishing, Beverly Hills, CA. 
Yin, R.K.,1989. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. Sage, Newbury Park, CA. 
Yin, R.K.,1994. Case study research: Design and methods, 2nd ed. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Zakaria, F., 2004. Islam, democracy, and constitutional liberalism. Political Science Quarterly 119 (1), 1. 
Zweynert, J., Goldschmidt, N., 2006. The two transitions in central and eastern Europe as processes of 
institutional transplantation. Journal of Economic Issues 40 (4), 895–918. 
